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Abstract
Studies of the role of the media in conflict situations have brought to the fore the significance of representa-
tions as an important part of the process of knowledge production about wars and the actors involved. The
media can influence interpretations and framing of conflicts, moulding specific understandings of their causes
and modalities of intervention. The Libyan war in 2011 is an interesting case to reflect on the United Nations
(UN) principle of Responsibility to Protect (RtoP), and how conflict affects those populations who occupy a
subordinate position in multiple stratification systems (gender, race, and class), whether they are locked in con-
flict zones or are trying to join the flow of people fleeing across borders. In the context of humanitarian inter-
vention, specific understandings of the migrants as social subjects become strongly correlated with correspond-
ing support mechanisms. This chapter conducts an intersectional analysis to provide a perspective on the
politics of the media representation of ‘migrants’ in Libya, discerning the key links between the constructions
of their masculinities and the practices of protection for ‘people on the move’. We show how, being situated at
the bottom of the social hierarchy in Libya, sub-Saharan black Africans were inappropriately presented in media
coverage during the initial phase of the conflict as subjects of adequate protection. Their invisibilization and
subordination by the media have been largely framed within international political and economic interests,
which have also reinforced the idea of the international community as the legitimate protector of civilians. We
argue that these representations reproduce migrants’ vulnerability and, by placing them in a situation of triple
jeopardy (structural, political, and representational), undermine the possibility of conceiving and understanding
security beyond their ‘naturalized’ victimization and subordination. 
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13.1 Introduction1 
Following the United Nations’ report Human Secu-
rity Now (Commission on Human Security/UNOPS
2003), the Responsibility to Protect (RtoP) has now
become the main normative framework for approach-
ing human vulnerabilities and international commu-
nity interventions (Fukuda-Parr/Messineo 2012).
While human security thinking is mainly concerned
with the multidimensional impacts of threats to peo-
ples, communities, and individuals, and is comple-
mentary to thinking on state security, the RtoP relates
specifically to how the international community – em-
ploying a variety of means, including military ones –
can prevent and stop genocides, war crimes, ethnic
cleansing and crimes against humanity occurring in in-
ternal conflicts (Hoogensen/Stuvoy 2006; Saxer 2008).
These normative frames when associated to migration,
“treat security as a value or condition” to be achieved
by people on the move. In doing so, they move beyond
the traditional understanding of state security, recogniz-
ing that “political concerns regarding security and mi-
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their contributions to the paper are considered equally
valuable. Maria DeVargas works as Researcher Assistant
and Project Officer for the project promoting this book
at the International Institute of Social Studies (ISS),
Erasmus University Rotterdam. She is a psychologist
with a Master’s in Development Studies at ISS. Stefania
Donzelli is a Ph.D. researcher at the International Insti-
tute of Social Studies (ISS), Erasmus University Rotter-
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gration have shifted beyond the state to the transna-
tional and global level” (Huysman/Squire 2009: 5).
Among the factors influencing access to security,
social relations of power delineated by gender play a
fundamental role. A consistent body of literature,
emerging in the last decade, has focused on the rela-
tionships between women, gender, and the interna-
tional security agenda, particularly UN Security Coun-
cil Resolution 1325 introduced in 2001 (Carey 2001;
McKey 2004; Hudson 2010; Heathcote 2011). Some
authors have entered the debate focusing on the vari-
ety of forms of insecurity faced by women in conflict
situations and while on the move, and showing
women as actors who can help to create a more posi-
tive environment for social well-being (Hill/Aboitiz/
Poehlman-Doumbouya 2003; Pezzotti 2005). Others
have broadened the meaning of security to cover
many complex global problems beyond its conven-
tional understanding, including environmental issues,
HIV/AIDS, and economic crises (Scheffran/Brzoska/
Brauch/Link/Schilling 2012; Gasper 2010; Truong
2009; Kristoffersson 2000). In general, most scholars
using the concept of gender have focused on women,
and have failed to develop more comprehensive ap-
proaches to men and masculinities. Yet, as shown by
Das (2008), empirical research has highlighted that at-
tention to gendered differences in terms of construc-
tions of masculinities and femininities can illuminate
the complexity of situations of vulnerability. Such
broader understandings of gender analyses, as Hoog-
ensen and Stuvoy (2006) argue, have the potential to
expand the definition of security from bottom-up per-
spectives by drawing attention to subjective experi-
ences and allowing more complex comprehensions of
the determinants of human insecurities. However, in
order to open spaces for people-centred meanings of
security, we claim the importance of deconstructing
the dominant understanding of those considered sub-
jects of protection as conveyed in public discourses.
In fact, by showing problematic aspects of dominant
discourses, we aim to highlight the importance of bot-
tom-up voices to promote a debate on how identity
constitutes a key element in articulating relationships
of security and protection, and also on how subjects
of protection as political actors in their own right can
construct more inclusive forms of protection.
This chapter seeks to contribute to this literature
by examining the links between migration, media con-
struction of masculinities, and human security, focus-
ing on the war in Libya in 2011, which triggered a crit-
ical migration emergency in the region. Our core
concern relates to the role and influence of media
representations in socially constructing sub-Saharan
black Africans’ identities. We argue that by reinforcing
their status of multiple subordinations, these media
representations contributed to reducing their access
to protection while fleeing the Libyan conflict or shel-
tering from violent situations. For our purposes, we
do not focus on evaluating the limits and merits of re-
lief programmes developed in the context of Human
Security and RtoP, but we seek to reflect on the me-
dia’s function in implicitly communicating proposals
about who should get access to these programmes
and how and why they should get it, as well as in le-
gitimating the underlying normative frames. 
In order to enter the debate on who gets access to
security, this study comprehends the meaning of ‘bor-
der’ as not limited to sovereignty and territoriality, but
also as the demarcation of legal and social boundaries
that allow different identities and groups to be de-
fined as subjects of protection. In these terms, the
meaning of border as the legal boundary of being a
‘refugee’, ‘migrant worker’, or ‘expatriate staff’ needs
to be exposed so that definitions of accountability
and norms as used by humanitarian organizations to
administer evacuation and provide protection can be
grasped. Similarly, the understanding of borders as
cultural, ethnic, and racial frontiers arising from inter-
group dynamics allows us to discern the different
pathways through which people become ‘locked into’
a conflict zone, or are made socially visible as human
subjects in need of protection. Exposing such legal
and social meanings of boundaries and the particular
value systems on which they are based, this chapter re-
flects on a constitutive element of the ‘politics of rep-
resentation’2 relevant to achieving more egalitarian
justice, namely constructions of differential locations
and forms through which diverse groups access pro-
tection, while others grant it (Fraser 2009). In this
sense, the analysis of boundaries among collective
identities presented in media information becomes
relevant to issues of ‘protection’ in so far as the com-
mon representational strategies used by the media
designate particular groups as ‘subjects’ to be pro-
tected or as responsible for protecting others. In
other words, the representation of actors involved in
conflict through such strategies as naturalization, nor-
malizing, categorization, or framing entails the con-
struction of the accountability of subjects, politics,
2 For readers unfamiliar with the concept, this ‘politics of
representation’ or media representations means the
forms in which media present identities and realities of
different subjects and events. 
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and actions in the field of human security (Hall 1997;
Leudar/Marsland/Nekvapil 2004; Zarkov 2011).
In Libya, the group of black people and sub-Saha-
ran black Africans is a heterogeneous population, in-
ternally stratified by race/ethnicity, age, religion, class,
sense of loyalty, nationality, and history of migration
into the country. They also constitute a highly gen-
dered group of migrants, in the sense that a consider-
able majority are male as men are more easily inte-
grated into the construction, agriculture, and oil
sectors offered by the Libyan labour market. Their
treatment and subordination have been largely deter-
mined3 by intersectional and dynamic patterns of vio-
lence related to the unfolding of the conflict. How-
ever, in addressing how the media construct sub-
Saharan black Africans’ masculinities in connection
with the Libyan conflict, it is important to observe
how, despite their diverse social locations, they tend
to be homogenized by race/ethnicity along the lines
of a ‘threat’ to different actors, and how this under-
mines their entitlements to security and protection as
human subjects under international norms. 
Studies of media and conflict have pointed out the
significant role and risky implications of media cate-
gorization and other representational strategies re-
garding the selective exposure and characterization of
certain actors and their particular conditions, which
provide moral accounts and justification for particular
actions (Hall 1997; Zarkov 2011; Tucker/Triantafyllos
2008; Fudge 2010). Media, located within the broader
frameworks of contemporary processes of globaliza-
tion and relying on discourses and forms of represen-
tation embedded in global societal power relations,
propose specific understandings of international in-
volvement, and may support non-intervention or call
for action (Hall 1997; Didero 2011; Fraser 2009). In vi-
olent conflicts, media construct perpetrators and vic-
tims in dichotomous ways, and often the information
presented is unable to capture the cultural and struc-
tural dynamics behind processes producing intersec-
tional identities, multi-layered belonging and affiliated
vulnerability within conflict zones and during the
process of fleeing. This makes the application of
norms of protection by the ‘protectors’ a dubious area
that must be subject to scrutiny towards the assembly
of more egalitarian perspectives on justice. 
To develop this argument, the chapter firstly dis-
cusses the theoretical posture on intersectionality
elaborated by Crenshaw and its relevance to reflecting
on the representation of sub-Saharan masculinities
during the conflict. It then presents the preconditions
for migrants’ vulnerability in Libya, showing how sys-
tematic discrimination against them, emerging also
from the historical development of migration policies
in Libya, affected sub-Saharan migrants during the
2011 Libyan conflict. Further, it discusses Bourdieu’s
concept of symbolic violence in relation to media rep-
resentations of sub-Saharan and others’ masculinities
during the war in Libya. Finally, the study analyses the
findings on sub-Saharan migrant masculinities as rep-
resented in three mainstream online news media: Al
Jazeera, The New York Times, and The Guardian.
These media were selected because they address an
international audience and have been influential ac-
tors in conveying specific understandings of the
events during the war (Leudar/Marsland/Nekvapil
2004). To conclude, we present some reflections on
the relevance of intersectionality to analysing media
characterization of various vulnerable groups, discuss-
ing the importance of uncovering media’s symbolic
forms of violence within the claim for more compre-
hensive, egalitarian, and bottom-up understandings of
human security. Some reflections on the practice of
journalism and migration policies are also presented.
In particular, the Libyan case raises important con-
cerns in terms of the regulation of human mobility
and the guidance and practice of Responsibility to
Protect. 
13.2 Understanding Masculinities 
Through the Lens of 
Intersectionality
The concept of intersectionality, since its emergence
within black and third world feminist movements in
the 1970s and its academic re-elaboration from the
late 1980s into the present, has inspired a comprehen-
3 This group of population includes Libyan citizens and
foreigners in transit, with temporary or permanent sta-
tus. In addition to their nationality and migratory status,
the class elements are relevant to defining their position
in the Libyan social hierarchy according to their educa-
tion and type of job. It is also important to contemplate
the diversity of race because not all come under the
labels of black race or sub-Saharan ethnic groups. How-
ever, political and conflict dynamics define a large part
of their treatment. For example: a black African who
has Libyan nationality and is loyal to Gaddafi is in a very
different position to a sub-Saharan black African
migrant worker, or one who is in transit to Europe, or
one detained by Gaddafi under his agreement with Italy
on extra-territorial control. However, during the con-
flict the pattern of actions taken against black ‘merce-
naries’ affected all the black population.
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sive body of literature that focuses on multiple and
cross-cutting forms and practices of exclusion, dis-
crimination, and oppression (Bürkner 2012). A main
contribution in this field was made by Crenshaw in
1989, who coined the term intersectionality to ad-
dress black women’s experiences of domestic violence
at the intersection of race and gender at different lev-
els, a neglected juncture between different systems of
oppression. Her approach allows an important dis-
tinction between the inequalities constituted by struc-
tural variables, e.g. to be poor, black, and male, and
by political factors, e.g. cultural variables and social re-
lations according to political agendas (Walby/Am-
strong/Strid 2012). The lens of intersectionality re-
veals how subjects are positioned and constituted by
mutual shaping and constitution of intertwined con-
text-specific structural conditions, discourses, and so-
cial practices (Yuval-Davis 2006; Walby/Amstrong/
Strid 2012). These social practices are understood as
context-based arrangements articulating overlays of
oppressions linked to the distribution of locations
and resources in society around different categories
such as gender, ethnicity, and class, and at different
levels such as structures, representations, or identity
construction (Bürkner 2012). Within this framework,
the understanding of contextual elements avoids es-
sentialism and generalizations that do not reflect the
intersectionality of various categories. 
Crenshaw (1991) delineates three levels of intersec-
tionality: structural, political, and representational.
Structural intersectionality refers to the production of
disempowered locations generated by intersecting
structural patterns of subordination. In the case of
black women addressed by the author, the junction of
race and gender make their experience different from
that of white women or black men. Political intersec-
tionality speaks of clashes in the political agendas of
different groups performing advocacy around particu-
lar features of marginal sectors and the imperatives
that the marginal subjects are facing. For instance, the
situation of black women is often ignored by the po-
litical agendas of both anti-racist and feminist groups,
who have marginalized the specific circumstances of
subordination of women of colour. Finally, represen-
tational intersectionality is linked to the construction
of subjects’ identities in popular culture. One example
would be constructions of black men as agents of sex-
ual violence against white communities, which be-
come their fixed potential victim (Crenshaw 1991).
Crenshaw’s frame contributes to debates on the
potential of the concept of intersectionality for analys-
ing the conditions of different social groups, by grasp-
ing the complexity of factors involved in producing
vulnerability and differentiated experiences of access
to a life with dignity and safety. This angle on intersec-
tionality can enable a more integral examination of
the normative frame of human security, both in terms
of deconstructing dominant notions and advancing a
people-centred perspective. It is consistent with femi-
nist approaches to human security that have high-
lighted the importance of acknowledging the differ-
ences masked by the term ‘human’ when addressing
the politics of multiple overlapping social relations of
power when engaged in the construction of the sub-
jects (Hudson 2005). In this sense, the concept of in-
tersectionality from Crenshaw’s perspective contrib-
utes to enriching the paradigm of human security,
because it facilitates the identification of multidimen-
sional aspects and cross-cutting factors that condition
a person’s life. In the migrants’ case, it is also applica-
ble to an analysis of access to safe spaces and life with
dignity, in terms of both an absence of direct threats
as well as the conditions required for a better quality
of life within a peaceful environment. 
The case of sub-Saharan migrants during the Lib-
yan conflict reflects an experience of the notion of
‘triple jeopardy’ used by feminist movements, mean-
ing the oppression generated by simultaneous and in-
terconnected patterns of oppression proceeding from
the systems of racism, imperial capitalism, and sexism
(Aguilar 2012). The location of sub-Saharan migrants
at the bottom of Libyan society as well as their vulner-
ability during the war appear linked to racialized,
classed, and gendered constructions of their identity.
These constructions are not fixed and their dynamics
are to a large extent defined by contextual factors.
They shift in the Libyan political system, moving from
an understanding of black migrant workers as a neces-
sary recruited labour force to economic burdens to
deport. These changes in the construction of mi-
grants’ identity make their lives precarious, reinforc-
ing their subordination, in a continuum along the
structural and representational levels proposed by
Crenshaw (1991). For this study, we focus on the rep-
resentational level, where media play an important
role in reinforcing or transforming the contents of
those social constructions. An intersectional analysis
of media representation will therefore result in a valu-
able tool for deconstructing how certain subjects are
included in the ideas of security advanced by media.
In this sense, the ‘triple jeopardy’ location of sub-Sa-
haran migrants as well as their representations in me-
dia become highly influential factors in the achieve-
ment of their human security as media participate in
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establishing the frame of the debate on mechanism of
protection.
Since, in the Libyan conflict, skin colour was a fac-
tor relevant to migrants’ vulnerability, we are inter-
ested in race. Race is here understood as a con-
structed differentiation of people who are grouped
around ‘exclusionary/inclusionary boundaries’ ac-
cording to phenotypic features (Yuval-Davis 2006:
201). Racial differences have been also used to con-
struct and justify ideas of superiority, discrimination,
and exploitation, which become normalized within
society (Gopalkrishnan/Babacan 2007). Racial social
hierarchies have deep historical roots, and they have
not always been rationally constructed nor con-
sciously identified. However, in conflict situations it is
common to find that the link between race and eth-
nicity is an important habitual strategy of representa-
tion used by media to construct the ‘good’ and ‘bad’
actors. Further, media’s selective reference to actors
and events in racial terms raises or lowers the visibility
of victims and perpetrators (Zarkov 2011). Inside this
process, the role of media in perpetuating ‘stereotypi-
cal images’ could undermine the security of vulnera-
ble groups because these ‘symbolic tools’ can influ-
ence practices dealing with the protection of civilians
(Carpenter 2005). 
In the case of Libya, a ‘rentier’ state with a small
population extremely dependent on a foreign work-
force, sub-Saharan migrants have usually been placed
at the bottom of social hierarchies, becoming scape-
goats for societal issues while performing jobs that are
unwanted by the local population under exploitative
conditions. Therefore, to understand migrants’ vul-
nerability it is relevant to reflect on the topic of class,
because class is a form of social boundary “grounded
in relation to the economic processes of production
and consumption” (Yuval-Davis 2006: 201). In addi-
tion, class variables generate different forms of ine-
quality and therefore are relevant to understanding
marginalized groups and masculinities. In conflict sit-
uations class is a key aspect linked to risk because
class determines the possibility of access to livelihood
resources, and is therefore a crucial element in guaran-
teeing access to security. At the representational level,
class divisions are usually normalized and migrants
have become naturalized as part of the lower classes, so
that selective access to protection is justified.
As mentioned earlier, gender is also a main aspect
of interest for this study because its analysis allows the
recognition of power relations established between
and within groups of men and women, in the frame
of societal structures that broaden or limit their op-
portunities in differentiated forms. Gender is here un-
derstood as a “mode of discourse that relates to
groups of subjects whose social roles are defined ac-
cording to constructed [sexual] differences” (Yuval-
Davis 2006: 201). This analysis helps us in conflict sit-
uations to appreciate the dissimilarities in terms of
gendered participation in and, the differentiated im-
pact of violence on women and men (Lorentzen/
Turpin 1998). Further, gender analysis uncovers addi-
tional understandings of media representations of
how male/female migrants deal with and should ac-
cess protection and security. For example, representa-
tions of civilian men in wars usually entail forced par-
ticipation in violence or involuntary-compulsory exile
from their community. This aspect of analysis is par-
ticularly relevant to the Libyan case, where most mi-
grants are male.4 Moreover, centring the analysis on
men makes it possible to identify how masculine char-
acteristics and values of physical force, bravery, and
honour are associated with the role of different actors
and their particular gendered involvement in con-
flicts. This is not to say that manhood and masculinity
are homogeneous categories: they intersect and inter-
act within various social relations of power embedded
in media representations. By adopting the intersection
of race, class, and masculinities within the conditions
of being sub-Saharan migrant workers as the main fo-
cus of analysis, we aim to understand how different
masculinities are set in hierarchies, defining both pri-
orities and positions from which to access protection
and security. To understand these hierarchies, it is use-
ful to begin with Connell (2005), who defines repre-
sentations of masculinities as “symbolic processes of
configuring practices” that transform gender relations
over time. Within these processes, different types of
masculinities can be identified: hegemonic, complicit,
and subordinated (Connell 2005: 72).
Hegemonic masculinity comprises a set of values
associated with the socially idealized model of man-
hood, implies dominance over other forms of mascu-
linity, and shapes the organization of social and sym-
bolic processes because of its links with institutional
power (Connell 2005). It tends in international media
representations – which often identify global values
and norms with mainstream Western ones – to be as-
sociated with a secular, independent, and well-edu-
cated Western white bourgeois man, who is able to
4 Surveys of returnees during the Libyan war suggest the
vast majority (over 95 per cent) are male and young (20
to 40 years) sub-Saharan migrants as well as Egyptians,
Tunisians, and Bangladeshis (IOM 2012).
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properly participate in wars to protect the nation and
its ideals (Das 2008; Foster 2007; Carrigan/Connell/
Lee 1985; Mohanty 1991; Connell 2005). Currently, he-
gemonic masculinity tends to be considered as not
marked by aggressiveness (which in a conflict context
is linked with modern warfare as the ‘civilized’ exer-
cise of violence through the “mediation of law and
technology” (Das 2008: 286)), but as rule-bound and
rational among the relevant ‘heroic’ virtues.
Complicit masculinities refers to a type of man-
hood that, even if lacking some of the qualities and
standards of hegemonic masculinity, still benefits
from it and sustains the same hegemonic project
(Connell 2005). From this logic complicit masculini-
ties gain recognition in the masculine arena and
achieve better power status for negotiation and
broader opportunities for their interests. Within a
warfare situation, this is the case for men who maybe
do not fulfil all characteristics (such as race, class,
knowledge, technology, or rationality) associated with
the West, but who embody “the image of idealized
masculinity through which they imagine themselves as
participating in a universal worldwide military cul-
ture” (Das 2008: 288). 
Finally, subordinated masculinities are the con-
structed sets “symbolically expelled from hegemonic
masculinity” (Connell 2005: 78), which therefore lack
legitimacy and whose characteristics tend to be
blurred with feminine ones. This category is usually
assembled as fragile, fearful, disgraceful, poorly edu-
cated, and therefore disempowered to act in negotia-
tion or to control affairs. Within conflict, subordi-
nated masculinities are usually presented as lacking
any heroic virtue such as courage or capacity for self-
sacrifice. Furthermore they are effeminate through
references of fear, fragility, and dependence, and
sometimes exposed within shameful situations to con-
finement, torture, or even sexual violence (Das 2008;
Zarkov 2011).
In addition to these three types of masculinity,
Connell (2005) introduced the category of marginal-
ized masculinities, related to a more complex set of
masculine hierarchies in which social differentiations
based on gender intersect with other features directly
associated with race, class, and so on. Marginalized
masculinities embody different symbolic roles which
are not just excluded from but antithetical to hegem-
onic masculinities. Within conflicts, for example, mar-
ginalized masculinities would include behaviour seen
as savage and under the control of visceral passions.
Their irrational characters lead them to inherently ni-
hilistic forms of violence. Moreover, they are often
represented as feminized in order to produce a humil-
iation of their manhood (Das 2008). 
13.3 The Production of Vulnerabilities 
and Instrumentalization of 
Migrants in Libyan Regulatory 
Migration Regimes 
In Libya’s territory, migrants are a significant pres-
ence: they account for between eleven and twenty-five
per cent of the population according to different fig-
ures, representing around 2.5 million foreign nationals
in the country before 2011 (IOM 2012). This figure in-
cludes from 1 to 1.5 million sub-Saharan Africans,
mainly from Niger, Chad, Mali, Nigeria, and Ghana
(CARIM 2011; IOM 2012). During the uprising and
the conflict in Libya in 2011, these groups suffered re-
peated experiences of violence, which strongly evi-
denced the conditions of vulnerability and life-threat-
ening conditions lived by sub-Saharans staying in or
transiting through Libya. 
The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) claims that this conflict has caused the worst
migration emergency in the region since the first Gulf
War. About 790000 migrants and their families
crossed borders and concurrently a consistently high
but indefinite number of migrants were caught in a sit-
uation of involuntary immobility, exposed to the vio-
lence of the war, stranded in overcrowded transit ar-
eas and camps, and obliged to use unsafe escape
routes. Sub-Saharan Africans constituted a large part
of this group, which was not in a position to be evac-
uated from the country (IOM 2012; IMI 2011; CARIM
2011). 
A number of historical preconditions gave rise to
sub-Saharan Africans’ vulnerability during the Libyan
war in 2011, including most importantly the historical
regulatory regime of migratory movements. In fact,
changing and sometimes contradictory migration pol-
icies have made migrants’ conditions in Libya precari-
ous. This particularly affected sub-Saharan Africans,
who have come to inhabit the most vulnerable posi-
tions in Libyan society, from which access to legal pro-
tection and economic resources is limited. Shifts in
migration policies have been employed to cope with
internal economic and political needs and used to sat-
isfy the requirements of the international alliances es-
tablished at each time. In particular, Libya’s profile as
a ‘rentier’ state meant that it both needed to attract an
immigrant workforce and was exposed to the volatil-
ity of oil prices. The latter in particular led to periods
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of unemployment during which the presence of mi-
grants was seen as a burden. Furthermore, in its shift-
ing political alliances with Arab, African, and Euro-
pean countries, the Libyan state saw advantages in
instrumentalizing the presence of migrants as political
leverage in international diplomacy, prioritizing its rai-
son d’état over the security of migrants. 
Historically, transnational mass migration to Libya
started in the early 1960s with the discovery of energy
resources in 1959 and the consequent establishment
of large modernization programmes, which stimu-
lated a high demand for a low-skilled labour force.
Given that the Libyan population was small, large
numbers of workers from neighbouring countries
were recruited and Libya begun to rely heavily on im-
migrants for its economic development (Brachet 2011;
De Haas 2008; IOM 2012). This trend continued until
the 1980s, when the collapse of oil prices and the
pressure of international embargoes5 made the coun-
try enter a period of recession. In an attempt to curb
unemployment, Libya reduced, through mass deporta-
tions, the numbers of migrant workers in the country
(Altunisik 1996). Given their presence in Libya at that
time, these deportations disproportionately affected
sub-Saharans,6 with a consequent reinforcement of
their status as the most marginal migrants in the coun-
try. At the beginning of the 2000s, Libya faced an eco-
nomic downturn and again used migrants as a scape-
goat for societal problems (Huliaras 2001; Paoletti
2011; IMI 2011). Particularly emblematic of this sec-
ond trend were the deportations following the clashes
between Libyan and sub-Saharan workers in 2000 that
had led to the killing of hundreds of migrants (John-
son 2000). In this case, state authorities did not pro-
tect the sub-Saharans. On the contrary, responding to
the hardening of anti-immigrant sentiments, more re-
strictive immigration policies were introduced and
mass expulsions organized. This, together with arbi-
trary police treatment reserved for sub-Saharan mi-
grants, increased the vulnerability of the wider black
population (De Haas 2008).
Since coming to power in 1969, Gaddafi took a
very pragmatic approach in his external policy, modi-
fying Libya’s alliances in response to transformations
in the political and economic international environ-
ment (Paoletti 2011). A common trend until the end
of the 1990s was a strong anti-Western stance. At the
beginning of the Gaddafi regime, Libya embraced
Nasser’s pan-Arabism (Huliaras 2001). As part of this
agenda, preferential treatment for Arab migrants was
given by, for example, facilitating access to Libyan cit-
izenship and to other rights (Global Detention Project
2009; CARIM 2011). This established an unfavourable
context for sub-Saharan Africans in terms of legal pro-
tection, with most able to access only the lowest-paid
and least-protected jobs, making them easily exploita-
ble and relatively more exposed to arbitrary police
treatment (De Haas 2008). Beginning in the 1990s,
Libya had to face the lack of support from Arab coun-
tries in the face of a UN embargo, and started to pur-
sue a pan-African policy. Among the leverages em-
ployed by Libya to strengthen this new alliance,
instrumental management of migrants took a substan-
tial role. Thus a policy of threatening and carrying out
deportations was later reversed into an open-door
policy towards sub-Saharan nationals, to show Libya’s
commitment to reinforce ties with African countries.
More precisely, the 1990s saw the adoption of legal
regulations to end visa requirements for sub-Saharan
Africans: Libya thus became a major destination for
migrants from West Africa and the Horn of Africa
(CARIM 2011). 
Another major change in Gaddafi’s international
agenda came with his alignment with Europe at the
beginning of the 2000s. This shift came about in rela-
tion to Libya’s intention to regain international re-
spectability, lift the embargo, and attract direct for-
eign investment. European interests in externalizing
‘border control’ to neighbouring countries also ex-
plain this shift7 (Paoletti 2011). As a result, Libya posi-
tioned itself as an EU partner in the governing of mi-
gratory movements by firstly reviving Italian-Libyan
colonial ties and later by cooperating with the Euro-
pean Union. Among the main agreements it is worth
remembering the 2003 operational pact, allowing It-
aly to sponsor the construction of detention camps
5 During the 1970s and 1980s Gaddafi pursued an anti-
Western imperialist policy, financially supporting insur-
gencies and radical governments in different parts of
the world, including sub-Saharan Africa. During those
years, Libya was accused by the West of supporting
international terrorism. In response to the country’s
conduct in international affairs, the United States set up
an oil blockade in 1982, the European Union established
arms restrictions in 1986, and the UN imposed an air
and arms embargo in 1992 (Ronzitti 2009).
6 Migrants from the sub-Saharan region represented nine
per cent of the total migrant population in Libya in 1984
(Paoletti 2011). However, when oil revenues decreased
in 1985, Tripoli expelled or laid off more than 100000
workers from Mali, Mauritania, and Niger in response
to an economic crisis (Huliaras 2001). In the same year,
80000 Tunisians and Egyptians were deported in a gen-
eral context where Libya accused Tunisia and Egypt of
being pro-US (De Haas 2008).
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for undocumented migrants in Libya; Italian financing
of Libyan police training for border surveillance, bor-
der control equipment, and deportations of migrants
from Libya to their countries of origin since 2004;
and the 2008 Friendship, Partnership and Coopera-
tion Treaty that sanctioned intense cooperation in dif-
ferent sectors and introduced new and contested
measures such as pushing back practices in violation
of the ‘principle of non-refoulement’8 (Ronzitti 2009;
Kumar 2011). This collaboration securitized migra-
tion, following the EU tendency to conflate crime,
terrorism, and migratory movement. This reduced ac-
cess to legal protection and the absence of any pres-
sure on Libya to ensure the protection of refugees
made the condition of its migrant workers and asylum
seekers from sub-Saharan Africa even more precarious
(Global Detention Project 2009; Kumar 2011). Thus
both economic and geopolitical peculiarities of Lib-
yan history led to the instrumentalization of migrants
as political leverage. 
The result of the cooperation between the EU and
Libya is a good example of how instrumental regula-
tion of migratory movements affected the security of
migrants in Libya. In fact, this new international pol-
icy on sub-Saharan migrants resulted not only in
tighter border controls and an expanded detention in-
frastructure but also promoted two further reforms
reducing migrant security. In 2004, harsher penalties,
heavy fines, and up to twenty years’ imprisonment for
crossing borders without the required travel docu-
ments were established (Global Detention Project
2009). In 2007, open-door policies were ended and vi-
sas for both Arabs and Africans became obligatory. At
the same time, changes concerning residence and la-
bour permits suddenly turned an unknown number of
immigrants into irregulars (CARIM 2011). In this con-
text, racist insults9 and attacks, inequitable police
treatment, thefts, and failure to be paid after complet-
ing work were increasingly reported by sub-Saharan Af-
ricans (Hamood 2008). These trends highlight how the
processes of migration management engender condi-
tions of vulnerability and open spaces for diffused legit-
imate violence against the migrant population. 
In sum, marginalization of migrants in Libyan soci-
ety, differential treatment for racially differentiated
groups of migrants, contradictory political agendas,
economic interests, and the processes of EU external-
ization of migration controls all laid the basis for the
reproduction and escalation of violence against sub-
Saharans during the 2011 conflict. This trend was evi-
dent even at the beginning of the protests: in February
2011, rumours and statements regarding Gaddafi’s hir-
ing of mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa resulted in
rebel forces attacking black people, both migrants
from sub-Saharan Africa and black Libyans. At the
same time, sub-Saharans and blacks feared both rebel
attacks and being drafted into Gaddafi’s army (Del
Grande 2011c). Their situation did not reach the atten-
tion of the international community, while stories of
black mercenaries did. The international community
did however uphold the principles of Responsibility
to Protect and human security as its underlying frame-
work with the declared intent of avoiding mass vio-
lence and guaranteeing the safety of civilians (ICRtoP
2012). In March 2011, UN resolutions 1970 and 1973
first imposed an arms embargo and a travel ban on
the Gaddafi family and members of government,
froze the assets of the Gaddafi family, and referred the
situation to the International Criminal Court for inves-
tigation, and later sanctioned a no-fly zone to protect
Libyan civilians, and authorized Member States, in co-
operation with the Security Council, to take “all neces-
sary measures […] to protect civilians and civilian popu-
lated areas under threat” (UN 2011).10 
This lack of attention to the position of sub-Saha-
rans was evident again in the process of evacuation or-
ganized by the international community. While Liby-
ans and groups of migrants fled the country in large
7 At the end of the 1990s and beginning of the 2000s the
EU increasingly framed Libya as a strategic territory for
the movements of people through the Saharan and
Mediterranean regions, despite the fact that the trans-
Saharan space has been traditionally crossed by people
in movement (Blanchet 2011). On the one hand, eco-
nomic downturns and regional conflicts increased
migration flows in the trans-Saharan space and tight
controls on other parts of the Mediterranean coast, in
particular the Straits of Gibraltar, resulted in a partial
reorientation of migratory movements with migrants
trying to reach Europe from Libya. On the other, Libya
remained mainly a destination country, but its descrip-
tion as a transit area has been used as political leverage
for Gaddafi to negotiate with European governments
(De Haas 2008; Branchet 2011; Paoletti 2011).
8 The principle of non-refoulement refers to “the obliga-
tion of states not to forcibly return people to countries
where they face persecution or serious harm” (UNHCR
2011).
9 It is common in Libya to refer to a black person with
the derogatory and depreciatory term of ‘abd’, in Eng-
lish ‘slave’ (Hamood 2008: 40).
10  See Press Release from United Nations, Security Coun-
cil 10200-6498th Meeting; at: <http://www.un.org/
News/Press/docs/2011/sc10200.doc.htm>. 
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numbers, in most cases sub-Saharan migrants did not
find a safe escape route and were involuntarily immo-
bilized in Libya without the basic conditions for a life
with dignity (IMI 2011; UNCHR 2011a). Sub-Saharan
migrants who reached the Tunisian, Egyptian, and
sometimes the Chadian borders requested refugee sta-
tus but remained stuck in transit camps (UNCHR
2011a). Even in the absence of precise data,11 it is pos-
sible to state that great numbers of civilians who es-
caped by sea died in the attempt (Forte 2011a). Those
who did manage to reach the coasts of Italy and
Malta found themselves in the detention-deportation
system of the European Union regime of migration
control (Del Grande 2011a). In particular, the meas-
ures provided by the Italian state under the frame-
work of an emergency Reception National Plan12 have
been criticized for holding asylum seekers under inhu-
mane conditions, examining asylum applications with
extreme slowness, and denying refugee status to most
non-Libyan nationals on the basis that they are in a
position to return to their home country (Garelli/
Tazzioli 2011; Vassallo Paleologo 2011). Concurrently,
internal displacement persisted, and violence against
blacks did not cease (Koser 2011; UNCHR 2011a/
b).13 Furthermore, the war in Libya has had negative
consequences for all migrants in terms of employ-
ment and income, increasing their vulnerability by re-
ducing their access to food and health care. This ma-
terial vulnerability is reflected in migrants’ returning
to their home countries, where they face a lack of eco-
nomic resources and their families are confronted by
the absence of remittances (IMI 2011; IMO 2012).
A set of contradictory interests have crossed the
discourses and practices of the international commu-
nity during this conflict, prioritizing migration control
over concerns about the security of migrants remain-
ing in Libya. In fact, even where external intervention
was planned to guarantee civilian safety, NATO forces
did not act consistently to protect sub-Saharan mi-
grants and refugees within and outside Libya. Mini-
mal evacuations and actions were organized to ad-
dress the particular dimensions of risks and threats to
the sub-Saharan population. On the contrary, Euro-
pean countries saw any movements towards their ter-
ritories as an ‘incoming invasion’14 and failed to act in
favour of migrants’ security, something particularly
needed for this group. Emblematic of this attitude has
been the Atlantic Alliance’s refusal to help migrants’
drifting boats at the end of March and at the begin-
ning of August, which caused dozens of deaths (Del
Grande 2012b). Even as substantial resources were al-
located for humanitarian aid and some emergency
evacuations were organized by UN agencies later in
the war, the protection of sub-Saharans’ lives was not
a clear priority. Instead, precedence seemed to be
given to the control of migratory movements. Indica-
tive of this is a proposition by the Italian government
in June 2011 that solicited NATO to block migrants’
ships and return them to the southern shore of the
Mediterranean, which clashed with Italian and Euro-
pean discourses and practices concerning humanitar-
ian aid and support (Migreurop 2011). In short, the
EU understanding of sub-Saharans as a potential
threat increased migrant vulnerability to violence and
life-threatening circumstances.
13.4 Symbolic Violence and Media 
Representations of the Libyan 
Conflict 
To confront the violence lived by sub-Saharan mi-
grants in Libya and the limited political will as well as
the action displayed by the international community
to guarantee their security, it is relevant to show how
the identities of sub-Saharan migrants have been con-
structed within the media. As the principal source of
11 According to UNHCR, “More than 1500 drown or go
missing trying to cross the Mediterranean in 2011”
(UNHCR 2012); at <http://www.unhcr.org/4f2803949.
html>. 
12 To consult the plan see at: <http://www.protezionecivile.
gov.it/resources/cms/documents/Piano_migranti.pdf>.
13 In a press release of 22 August 2011, Antonio Gutterres,
High Commissioner for Refugees, is quoted as follows:
“We have seen at earlier stages in this crisis that such
people, Africans especially, can be particularly vulnera-
ble to hostility or acts of vengeance” (UNCHR 2011a).
Addtionally, at the time of writing [August 2012], three
sub-Saharan asylum seekers were killed by the Libyan
military during a protest in a detention centre for refu-
gee applicants to the east of Tripoli. See at: <http://
habeshia.blogspot.it/2012/08/a-massacre-of-asylum-seek-
ers-in.html> (30 August 2012).
14 De Haas (2012) has noted that both European politi-
cians and media have repeatedly referred to an incom-
ing invasion. For example the Italian Minister of Foreign
Affairs, Franco Frattini, has talked about “an invasion of
two to three hundred thousands of migrants”, while the
Italian Interior Minister has referred to a “human tsu-




html> (20 June 2012).
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information on which global public opinion relies,
media representations produce meanings and rela-
tions that make sense of the violence they narrate
and, consequently, suggest appropriate behaviour and
conduct (Titscher 2000). Representations of different
actors in war contexts, through specific narratives,
framings, and categories, are key elements through
which media implicitly or explicitly advocate, con-
struct, or justify modes of action (Leudar/Marsland/
Nekvapil 2004). It follows that how sub-Saharan mi-
grants have been approached will be strongly con-
nected to media representations of the Libyan con-
flict as well as of its causes, responsibilities and con-
tributing factors, and the possible solutions to the
migration crises that it entailed. 
As mentioned earlier, intersectional analysis can il-
luminate how the positioning and constitution of sub-
jects and groups in society are constructed at different
levels and through different and interrelated social
discourses and practices. Since social discourse is at a
macro-level filtered through and by media, our focus
on media aims to address the level of symbolic repre-
sentations circulating in societies. Such representa-
tions have been defined by Bürkner (2012), following
Crenshaw (1991), as part of the meso-dimension of in-
tersectionality, revealing interdependencies among dif-
ferent societal structures (macro-dimension) and proc-
esses of identity construction (micro-dimension).
However, for our purposes, only the interconnections
between symbolic representations and structures need
to be addressed. Thus here intersectional analysis is
employed to enable us to comprehend how media
representations of sub-Saharan migrants during the
2011 Libyan war suggested why and how migrant secu-
rity should be addressed and who should address it,
and placed this within a context of transnational migra-
tion management. In addition, this analysis specifically
focuses on how the intersections of the categories of
masculinities, race, and class enable a deeper compre-
hension of media representations and their role in con-
flict, as well as how this affects other actors. 
Finally, the analysis reveals suggestions conveyed
by such representations about how to address mi-
grants’ access to security in conflict, expressed in
many cases through categorization15 strategies. For ex-
ample, when sub-Saharans are defined as ‘mercenar-
ies’ – in journalists’ reports ‘according to rumours’16 –
some media implicitly argue for the need to control
and securitize ‘these dangerous’ subjects, instead of
arguing for their protection. This type of categoriza-
tion also supports the rebels’ call for an external inter-
vention by the international community in order to
pacify the situation.17 In addition, when migrants are
described as ‘poor’ and ‘desperately hoping’ to reach
Europe, the implicit message argues for the impor-
tance of limiting arrivals of sub-Saharans on European
coasts, as they might constitute a danger for the local
population because of their condition of despair.18
Media representations of sub-Saharans during the
coverage of the Libyan war as well as their implica-
tions for migrants’ security have been debated both in
academia and other circles. The international media’s
silence about the lynchings of both sub-Saharan
migrants and black Libyans in the first stage19 of the
conflict has been criticized as diminishing the dignity
and worthiness of these lives (Chatora 2011; Marshall
2011; Forte 2011a/b). Further, media emphasis on the
rebels’ claims about sub-Saharan mercenaries may, it
has being argued, have fuelled these events, firstly by
corroborating unconfirmed information and secondly
by making violence against the black population in
Libya acceptable by framing sub-Saharan migrants as
dangerous subjects. These media representations have
been seen as reinforcing the urgent claims for external
support to the rebellion, later concretized with the
NATO humanitarian intervention. Overall, media also
have been thought to support the narrative of a united
Arab Libyan people committed to fighting against an
isolated Gaddafi, supporting calls for an international
intervention (Forte 2011a/b; Marshall 2011). Interna-
tional media have also been criticized for constructing
the fear of an invasion of Europe by overemphasizing
sub-Saharans’ movements from Libya to Europe
across the Mediterranean, without questioning the
dimension of the real numbers20 or the lack of protec-
tion experienced by migrants (De Haas 2012). 
15 ‘Mercenaries’, ‘poor desperate’, ‘helpless’, and ‘trapped’
are some of the most frequent terms found in the news
media in reference to the sub-Saharan population in
Libya.
16 See Forte, 2011 “The top ten myths in the war against
Libya”; at: <http://pambazuka.org/en/category/fea-
tures/77439>.
17 See for example article (1) analyzed from the New York
Times.
18 See for example article (2) analyzed from the New York
Times and articles (3) and (4) from Al Jazeera. 
19 We consider the first stage to have lasted from February
to July 2011, when violence against sub-Saharan Africans
was invisibilized. It was not until August, with the publi-
cation of human rights and other international studies,
that media started to mention in a more visible way the
lychings of sub-Saharan Africans.
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However, research exploring sub-Saharan racializa-
tion has failed to intersect such understanding with
gendered social practices. Thus this study, conducted
on the media representation of sub-Saharan migrant
masculinities during the Libyan conflict, may be one
of the first. It shows that the construction of their
identity in the news has strongly relied on ideas about
maleness: as presented by different studies, migration,
conflict, and state21 are highly gendered processes
and institutions whose meanings media contribute to
constructing. For example, sub-Saharan men were of-
ten framed as potentially active actors in the conflict,
whether as mercenaries or as objects of forced enlist-
ment:22 their participation or exclusion from the war
as well as their sense of loyalty were part of the con-
struction of their maleness. The same could be said
about the media representation of ‘migrants’ in Libya
as an exclusively male category. These elements influ-
enced their positioning at the bottom of different hi-
erarchies of masculinities, at the same time that it had
important repercussions for the framing of their vul-
nerability and the possible understanding of their hu-
man security. This shows the relevance of considering
masculinities of migrants in the 2011 Libyan conflict.
Additionally, as some studies in racist violence sug-
gested, masculinity is relevant “since the perpetrators
of most racial attacks are young men attacking other
young men” (Anthias 2007: 14). 
Thus, media representations constitute and posi-
tion subjects, suggesting, justifying, or promoting par-
ticular behaviours and actions (Leudar/Marsland/
Nekvapil 2004). In so doing, such representations
may exercise forms of symbolic violence by legitimiz-
ing as valid certain models and norms. As Bourdieu
suggests, symbolic violence is a “hidden […] gentle, in-
visible form of violence, which is never recognized as
such” (Bourdieu 1977: 192). It assigns characteristics to
social groups that make acceptable and even natural
their subordinated or privileged location, while ques-
tioning these positions is made harder precisely be-
cause such normalization is not openly exposed
(Bourdieu 1977). Additionally, as socio-psychological
studies have shown, the symbolic violence intrinsic to
stereotypes and prejudices is difficult to convert with-
out detailed and deep analytical reading, because
much of the content and subtle assumptions of such
stereotypes and prejudices can be beyond rational
awareness (APS 1997). Therefore it is important to re-
flect on dominant discourses, observing the elements
and actors included, the ways in which they are repre-
sented, and the consequences of these representa-
tional strategies for debates about security. Represen-
tation may thus justify subordination, discrimination,
exclusion, and marginalization of subjects who do not
meet established norms. In Fraser’s terms, “represen-
tation [is] the defining issue of the political”, establish-
ing who is subject to what security (Fraser 2009: 18). 
13.5 Visibilizing the Role of Media in 
the Creation of Human 
Insecurity: Information on the 
Libyan War 2011 
As the Libyan conflict became an international issue
with the involvement of the so-called international
community, this chapter uses three international
mainstream media that aimed to address a global pub-
lic. All three have online editions, generally free and
more accessible, and in this chapter we consider a se-
lected number of news and opinion articles covering
the period of the conflict from the beginning of the
protests in February 2011 to the death of Gaddafi in
October 2011. The media selected are The New York
Times (NYT), The Guardian (TG), and Al Jazeera
English (AJ). The first is a US national daily newspa-
per and its online edition is one of the most viewed in
the world, despite the fact that since 2011 free online
access to its archive has been limited. Its political line
is considered centrist, and it is owned and financially
controlled by a corporation. The Guardian is a British
national daily newspaper, also with an international
online multimedia presence. Its editorial line tends to-
wards centre-left liberalism and its position on migra-
tion issues tends to be considered quite progressive.
Its contents and archives are freely available online.
Funded by a charitable foundation, The Guardian
claims to be characterized by political independence.
Al Jazeera English is a news channel broadcasting
from Doha and London. It aims to provide a liberal
perspective from the Global South on global issues,
specifically conveying a Middle Eastern point of view.
It has been criticized for adopting both a pro- and an
anti-Western bias, and also for reporting in a crude
style described as a ‘negative trend’.23 Financially, Al
20  It is estimated that just 24465 persons (3.9 per cent) of
the overall 790000 migrants and their families fleeing
Libya arrived in Italy and Malta (IMO 2012).
21 Charlotte Hopper (2008) is one of the few authors who
elaborate on the links between masculinities and state,
particularly in the book Manly States: Masculinities,
International Relations and Gender Politics.
22 See Al Jazeera (2), (3), (6), and (9).
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Jazeera depends mostly on Qatari government subsi-
dies.
In addition to their wide audience, the criteria ap-
plied for selecting these media have been their recog-
nition at the international level and the different per-
spectives they are believed to offer in terms of
political and geographical standpoints. For the selec-
tion of articles, at first we conducted a research exer-
cise into archives to identify news dedicated to the
Libyan conflict and focusing on sub-Saharan Africans.
Second, from this base sample we chose specific arti-
cles to analyse – news and opinion texts – connected
to relevant events24 during the conflict which saw the
involvement of sub-Saharan migrants; in doing so, we
attempted to balance the selection of articles to cover
the period mentioned. After a detailed examination
of thirty selected articles,25 the analysis demonstrated
homogeneous patterns in terms of the representation
of masculinities among all selected articles – notwith-
standing the different sensibilities and ideological in-
clinations of both media and journalists. In this way,
we arrived at thematic/data saturation as the purpose
of our sample was “not to count opinions [...] but to
explore the range of […] different representations” of
subjects (O’Reilly/Parker 2012: 3).
The analysis procedure first focused on identifying
the main narratives presented in the material ana-
lysed, specifically the assumptions and values pro-
duced in the text in the way characters, actions, and
events relate to each other (Titscher 2000). These
were searched for clues to understand how media sug-
gest addressing the security of sub-Saharan migrants
in the conflict. This analysis was further enriched by
reasoning about the framing of the articles analysed,
especially the aspects of reality made more salient or
excluded so as to convey a particular understanding
of the events narrated (Zarkov 2011). Finally, categori-
zation analysis allowed for an understanding of how
sub-Saharan migrants and their masculinities have
been represented, and how these representations jus-
tify certain type of actions towards them (Leudar/
Marsland/Nekvapil 2004).
Within the articles considered, three main narra-
tives related to the 2011 Libyan conflict have been
identified through a reading of the text aimed at iden-
tifying ‘topoi’ or argumentations explaining the situa-
tion in which sub-Saharans found themselves in Libya
(Reisigl/Wodak 2001). These refer to the revolution,
migration crisis, and humanitarian intervention, with
racism as a cross-cutting theme. They were not devel-
oped at the same time in all the articles analysed, but
these implicitly supported each other and offered a
general framework of interpretation for the events
that the media provide an account for. Along this line,
all three media offered common readings and per-
spectives and only a few differences or major tenden-
cies can be noticed. Al Jazeera tended to provide
more information regarding the context of Libya and
the sequencing of events, acknowledging the com-
plexity of its society. For instance it recognized differ-
ences in terms of ethnic/racial groups living in the
country, acknowledging diversity in the Libyan popu-
lation in terms of phenotypes.26 The Guardian was
more inclined to present migrants as victims and
claim the moral importance of addressing issues re-
lated to their security, consequently celebrating its
role as an ethical agent.27 Finally, The New York
Times distinguished itself by insistently essentializing
23 Adjective used in a letter attributed to Mike Maples,
director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, in a
wikileaks, at: <http://www.cablegatesearch.net/cable.
php?id=06DOHA371> (May 2012). 
24 The relevant events considered have been: evacuations
and spreading of rumours about sub-Saharan mercenar-
ies at the beginning of the conflict (February and March
2011), sub-Saharans’ boat voyages in the Mediterranean
(April–August 2011), relevant battles in Misrata (May
2011) and Tripoli (August 2011), media acknowledge-
ment of massacres of sub-Saharans (August and Septem-
ber 2011), death of Gaddafi (October 2011).
25 A complete list of the selected articles and their internet
links is presented in table 13.3 below.
26 This is the case in the Al Jazeera article (2) where under
the subtitle of dangerous racism, it is stated: “In the
past, Gaddafi has oppressed both black Libyans and eth-
nic Arab Berbers in the western Nafusa Mountains. Last
year, the regime lashed out against the Tabu tribe,
darker-skinned Libyans who live in and around the
towns of Sabha and Kufra near the Chad border.” This
information confirms once more that the black popula-
tion belongs to diverse groups of black Libyans, instead
of just sub-Saharan Africans.
27 In all pieces analysed from The Guardian, concern for
sub-Saharan migrants is expressed, with a tendency to
portray them as victims. In articles (3), (7), and (10), the
role of media as actors denouncing injustice and thus
contributing to attracting attention to problems to be
resolved is openly celebrated. No discussion of the
frame which media adopts to foster their denunciations
is offered. On the contrary, when it is recognised that
journalists may have participated in falsely labelling sub-
Saharans in Libya as mercenaries, article (10) minimizes
these errors, arguing that media have showed to be able
to correct themselves, proving the reliability of their
reports and interpretations.
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spaces of Africa, Libya, and Europe, thereby reducing
the complexity of the processes described.28 
At the outset of the analysis it is important to
point out that the revolution29 is represented as a
stage in a positive and necessary developmental proc-
ess moving toward Western liberal democracy as a
sort of end of history. That is, in the heart of the
struggle for power between anti-government protest-
ers and Gaddafi’s loyalists, the former are represented
as champions of democracy and human rights moving
closer to the accomplishment of these values (AJ 2-9-
6; NYT 2-5-9; TG 7-10). Notwithstanding the military
imbalance between the two groups, since the begin-
ning of the protests the rebels’ possibilities of success
are exalted, while Gaddafi is constantly described as
on the brink of defeat (AJ 5-6; NYT 1; TG 1-9). A
highly teleological vision is deployed, according to
which Libya is seen as chasing the West and its ideals
with the whole country’s population united in sup-
porting this effort (AJ 6-9; NYT 1-5; TG 7-10). A West-
ern liberal democracy, a market-oriented economy,
and modern social organization are represented as the
best and more likely future, guaranteeing justice, free-
dom, and prosperity to ‘all’ those living in Libya.
However, the rebels’ approach to democracy is seen
as incomplete because – despite their rhetoric of sec-
ularism, transparency, and rule of law – the opposi-
tion’s commitment to Western values remains to be
proven in the post-revolutionary period. This is pre-
sented in contrast with the long history of Western
democratic experiences, which emerge as superior (AJ
2; NYT 2-3-5; TG 7). 
Episodes of non-legitimate violence committed by
the rebels were denoted as indicative of the limits of
Libya’s revolution: “Libya’s spectacular revolution has
been disgraced by racism” as titled by the Guardian at
the end of August (TG, 10).30 However, in the media,
the origin of such violence was identified as the
weight of Gaddafi’s inheritance, diminishing the op-
position’s responsibility (AJ 2-3-9; NYT 5; TG 2-3-4-6-
10). The racist attacks against sub-Saharans in Libya
are emblematic of this story line: the root cause of
this violence was identified as a long history of exploi-
tation and discrimination against sub-Saharan mi-
grants throughout Gaddafi’s regime, in some way nor-
malizing the spread of racism31 in society. The
weakness of the revolution was seen as proceeding
from years of repression which have caused the ab-
sence of organized movements able to move beyond
racist understandings of nationalism and construct an
inclusive sense of belonging (TG 10). The violence of
the repression ordered by Gaddafi was then presented
as a multiplier of the racist tendencies of Libyan soci-
ety: the brutal attacks of government loyalists ob-
scured the protesters’ capacity of judgement (AJ 1;
NYT 4; TG 3). This subtle message is particularly re-
inforced through the image of sub-Saharan Africans as
mercenaries, which also explains the violence suffered
by them (AJ 1-6-7; NYT 1-9-10; TG 1). Further, it was the
war that – by impeding the implementation of a justice
system – enabled a situation of diffused violence. The
opposition was presented as having good intentions
and Western sympathies, while the savage and cruel
forces of Gaddafi worked to undermine the revolution
as a hope for democracy (AJ 5-6; NYT 1; TG 4-7-10). 
The migration crisis was represented by media as
fully the responsibility of Gaddafi (AJ 1; NYT 5; TG
3). This is exemplified by another title: “Helping
Libya’s refugees is the better way to beat Gaddafi”
(TG 7). Opposing and resisting a necessary change,
the Colonel was generally seen as the principal subject
to blame for the disastrous effects of the war. In par-
ticular, complex migratory movements and increased
vulnerabilities that resulted from the conflict and af-
fected all migrants in Libya (sub-Saharan or not) was
understood as taking place due to Gaddafi’s choices.
He was seen as committed to ‘creating’ refugees by
spreading violence within Libya and impeding rescue
efforts; he was also presented as attempting to force
sub-Saharan Africans in Libya to fight on his side or
leave the country (AJ 2-3; NYT 3-4-5; TG 2-4-5-10). Fi-
nally, he was portrayed as ‘exploiting boat people’ by
facilitating their journey across the Mediterranean in
order to frighten Europe with the possibility of mas-
sive arrivals of migrants (AJ 2; NYT 2-5; TG 4-7). To
support such a reading of the crises, as noted earlier,
media tended to diminish the responsibility of the
rebel anti-Gaddafi forces with regard to migrants’ se-
curity (AJ 2-3-7; NYT 4-5-9; TG 2-4-5-10). In short, the
media story was that as a result of a conflict desired
by Gaddafi, migrants were obliged to expose them-
28 This tendency is particularly evident in articles (1), (2),
and (3) from the NYT. In these cases Libya tends to be
represented as a dangerous place, Europe is a stable and
prosperous area, while sub-Saharan countries are charac-
terised by poverty, corrupt governments, and stagnant
economies.
29 It is important to notice that the understanding of revo-
lution as a necessary step is one of the main narratives
found in media, and it also became a justification for
the conflict and its consequences. 
30 See also articles (5), (9), and (10) from NYT, and AJ (2). 31 See AJ (2) and (6), and NYT (9).
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selves to very risky situations: internal displacements
or perilous travels across the Mediterranean, carrying
additional dangers and insecurities for sub-Saharan
migrants previously living and working in Libya. 
Movements of people were seen by media as car-
rying negative consequences not only for the migrants
themselves, but for other actors too. For example, Eu-
ropean states were represented as legitimately perceiv-
ing their coasts as ‘invaded’ and facing resentment to-
wards migrants by their populations, widely
supportive of anti-immigration stances (AJ 4; NYT 2-
3; TG 5-8). The rightness of such positions was then
justified by the idea that migrants, especially sub-Saha-
rans, are untrustworthy and dangerous subjects for
Europe (AJ 3; NYT 2-3). The media suggestion was
that most, by entering Libya illegally, had proven
themselves to be disrespectful of rules. Further, their
desperate condition was seen as a factor that might
cause further problems to European countries, as des-
peration leads to desperate and irrational behaviours
(NYT 2-3). In addition, Tunisia and Egypt were other
actors presented in some of the articles analysed as
facing the problems of migratory movements. Not-
withstanding their proven goodwill in helping mi-
grants, the two North African states had to face exas-
peration from their own citizens for the problems
caused by sub-Saharans in refugee camps who ‘stu-
pidly protested’ about their situation without appreci-
ating the efforts made by those countries (TG 6). As
a consequence, the needs for border control, refugee
camps, and organized management of migratory
movements were implicitly presented as necessary and
appropriate solutions for avoiding additional prob-
lems in destination countries and for migrants them-
selves (AJ 3-4; NYT 3-7; TG 6).
From these understandings of the conflict and mi-
gration crises, the humanitarian intervention was es-
tablished by media as a necessity in order to save lives
from the irrational violence of Gaddafi’s forces. The
international community was the actor charged with
the responsibility of preventing fighting from escalat-
ing and alleviating suffering (AJ 1-2-5-6-7-8; NYT 1-2-3-
4-7; TG 1-3-5-7). However, even if the term ‘interna-
tional community’ conventionally refers to the com-
munity of world states and UN organizations as sup-
posedly super partes actors, in media it more often
indicates just Western states and certain international
agencies as high moral subjects committed to protect
Others, beyond the principle of sovereignty (AJ 1-8;
NYT 1-2; TG 1-2). Such selective use of the term estab-
lishes a hierarchy in which states like Egypt or Tunisia,
though actively engaged in the organization of human-
itarian support, are represented as less organized and
proactive in the effort to save human lives (TG 1-6).
This contrasts with visions of Western states and UN
agencies as endowed with the means and resources
for assessing the situation and best planning any inter-
vention. In this vision, they are courageous and gener-
ous agents ready to self-sacrifice, have great care for hu-
man lives, and have the capacity to act (AJ 1-3; TG 1-2). 
When the international community fails to comply
with these standards publicly, its accountability is es-
tablished through different techniques. First, other re-
sponsibilities are identified and often these are not el-
ements within the control of the so-called
international community: for example, the weather or
the bureaucratic system is seen as hampering rescue
efforts in the Mediterranean (TG 2-4). Also, the irra-
tionality of other actors can be used to explain the in-
ternational community’s failures: sub-Saharans in des-
perate situations would be inclined to not exercise
clear judgement and to put their lives at risk, as when,
trying to capture the attention of a rescue boat, they
move to one side of their ship, causing it to capsize
(TG 2). Moreover, NATO and EU states are pictured
as self-reflexive and prone to take actions that will im-
prove their tactics and strategies of intervention, for
instance improving coordination efforts for evacua-
tions and lifesaving missions at sea (NYT 5-7; TG 7-
8:). Finally, media and other actors take the role of
powerful watchdog, engaged to show the interna-
tional community unforeseen problems and to envi-
sion possible solutions, as in the case of unanticipated
migratory movements towards Europe or racist at-
tacks on black Libyans and migrants in Libya (AJ 2-3-
5-6; NYT 5; TG 5-7-10). In this case, in addition to mi-
grants’ testimonies employed to confirm the informa-
tion presented, many references to Western values of
liberal democracy serve as guidelines for actions, com-
pletely legitimizing the actual organization of the
world order and failing to address existing inequalities
and imbalances (AJ 2-6-9; NYT 5; TG 7).
In a nutshell, media represented the Libyan con-
flict as a step in the country’s process towards West-
ern ideals and modernity; they show its migration cri-
ses as the result of irrational, cruel, and short-sighted
policies by Gaddafi, and this implies that support for
the management of migratory movements by Western
interventions was necessary to achieve security, free-
dom, and the democratic principles of the interna-
tional order. Direct and subtle associations in the arti-
cles analysed indicate strongly that media conveyed
suggestions that reinforced mainstream international
models while play-acting mobilizations for migrants’
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security. This reading of the events and processes de-
scribed is reinforced through different strategies, in-
cluding media’s silences over certain elements. For ex-
ample, the lack of mention of the civilians killed by
the NATO intervention allowed a dichotomous vision
of the conflict in which good and evil faced each
other, making invisible those suffering and whose ex-
perience could not function to support such readings
of the conflict. The superiority of Western democra-
cies, in relation not only to the Gaddafi government
but also to the incoming opposition, was made possi-
ble by excluding memories of past European coloniza-
tion and the present reality of a legitimized racism
against black Africans. The absence of any reflection
on how EU migration control policies played a role in
limiting sub-Saharan migrants’ possibilities for safe
evacuation contributed to a polarized comprehension
of the situation, which is revealed in the silence sur-
rounding the expulsions of asylum seekers from Eu-
rope. The lack of acknowledgement of Western geo-
political and economic interests also contributed to
legitimizing and celebrating the NATO intervention.
More examples could follow, but for the purposes of
this study, our attention is now turned to the media
categorization of sub-Saharan migrants.
Within media representations, different sets of
masculine values can be distinguished, organized in hi-
erarchies and associated with different social groups.
The hegemonic model of masculinity is here linked to
constructs of the international community as a neutral
actor not directly involved in the conflict, but whose
efforts aim at saving lives. In doing so, the interna-
tional community displays skills related to rationality,
expertise, moral strength, and determination, while
being guided by heroic virtues related to courage, gen-
erosity, and capacity for self-sacrifice (AJ 1-3-4-7; NYT
10; TG 1-2-7-9). Further, the availability of means and
resources not only represents the international com-
munity’s capacity to feasibly respond to crises and
conflicts, it also makes it possible to relate actors to
different ideas of success (AJ 8; NYT 1-2; TG 1). As
emerged from the narrative analysis, the term ‘inter-
national community’ often refers to only Western
states and selected international agencies. From here
it is easy to infer that the success associated with he-
gemonic masculinity in this case refers not only to the
economic area, but is a manifestation of Western
achievements in different fields, mainly connected to
the model of the white race, professional education,
aid workers, policymakers, entrepreneurs, or corpo-
rate managers. Media representation of hegemonic
masculinity thus becomes involved in legitimizing a
specific array of values and reproducing dominant so-
cial relations (Carrigan/Connell/LeeReviewed 1985;
Connell 1998). 
The complicit category of masculinity in the con-
text of the Libyan war could be identified in the
rebels, the opposition to Gaddafi. Anti-government
Table 13.1: Media narratives related to the 2011 Libyan conflict. Source: The authors.
Revolution Stage in a developmental process directed towards a model of society based on liberal 
democracy, free market, and other values presented as Western.
Result of long years of Gaddafi’s regime, which spread hate and enabled episodes of ille-
gitimate violence to take place (e.g. repression, racism, and violence against different eth-
nic groups). 
Contributes to demonstrating the backwardness of some countries and the superiority of 
the West that does not need conflicts to provide freedom, stability, and prosperity. 
Event to support the process of democratization in other parts of the world through 
Western institutions and organizations.
Migration crises Result of Gaddafi’s behaviour: he did not care about putting the life of migrants at risk in 
Libya as his way of resisting a necessary change.
Situation of danger for migrants themselves, but also for Europe and Libya’s neighbour 
countries.
Situation to support an efficient and organized management of migratory movements as 
a necessity for achieving security
Humanitarian intervention Situation for the West to use its generosity, skills, and abundant resources to save the lives 
of thousands of civilians.
Event to support Libya’s path towards liberal democracy, free markets, human rights prin-
ciples, etc.
Action through which the West establishes its accountability.
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forces, “former regime notables, businessmen and
professionals as well as exiles” (TG 10), were in fact
associated with certain values of hegemonic masculin-
ity: proactivity and determination, advanced educa-
tion, democracy, and the principles of the free mar-
ket. However, the rebels distanced themselves from
the international community’s hegemonic model of
masculinity by fighting a war using violence and by
their lack of military technology and strategy (AJ 5-6;
NYT 9). Because Gaddafi’s opposition sought to en-
gage in conflict rather than just employing its re-
sources in the service of others – as Western masculin-
ity is represented to do – they are seen as
developmentally a step behind the international com-
munity (NYT 2-3-5; TG 7). Nonetheless, this behav-
iour is identified as a necessary act of courage. From
this perspective, the rebels are allowed to receive sup-
port from the international community because they
fulfil the majority of qualities of the hegemonic model
of masculinity, including their concern for assisting
and supporting those in need (NYT 4; TG 9). As a re-
sult, the values in media representations associated
with the rebels’ complicit masculinity work again to
support hegemonic masculinity’s values and the dom-
inance of the rational, polite, and educated man mov-
ing within the frame of capitalist interests. An illustra-
tive example is the start of one Al-Jazeera article:
“Sporting a crisp well-tailored grey suit and pink tie,
Harris Mohamed Zuwei looks more like an aspiring
banker than a Libyan pro-democracy fighter who took
a bullet for the cause” (AJ 6). 
The subordinate model of masculinity is here em-
bodied by Gaddafi, the ‘mad dog’ of the Middle East,
as President Reagan defined him in the 1980s.32 Me-
dia portrayed the Colonel as a non-modern and irra-
tional figure, whose cruel and unreasonable decisions
had very serious and negative consequences for al-
ready marginalized subjects.33 Demonstrating a defi-
ciency of clear judgement by choosing to oppose what
is presented as an upcoming and inevitable change,
Gaddafi and his loyalists put at risk the lives of the vul-
nerable and thus came to symbolize cowardice and
the lack of any heroic virtue, “gangster[s] who hold
foreigners at knifepoint in the Libyan streets” (NYT
2). Egotistically attached to power, their behaviour is
explained by media with reference to hysteria, associ-
ating this subordinate manhood with feminine fea-
tures (TG 3). This type of masculinity is then banished
from the hegemonic model, and lacks legitimacy in re-
lation to the norms supported by the latter. However,
this expulsion does not constitute a negation, as in
fact Gaddafi is still represented as a subject endowed
with agency: he does not simply react; on the contrary
he is an extremely proactive agent. From this sense of
initiative, his moral and ethical condemnations
emerge and find justification (TG 7). Consequently,
according to the logic of contraries, the hegemonic
masculinity embodied by the Western international
community is again reinforced by the media through
the insistent message of its necessary action to control
Gaddafi’s ‘erratic’ performance (AJ 9).
Mainstream international media fixed images of
sub-Saharan migrants through categories associated
with ideas of passivity or dangerousness. The repre-
sentations of sub-Saharan black Africans entrenched a
dispossession of hegemonic masculinity’s qualities
and resources, making them useless, helpless,34 or ir-
rationally violent actors. They are ‘poor’, ‘desperate’,
‘afraid’, ‘trapped’, or ‘brutal mercenaries’, ‘on the
front line’. In this way sub-Saharan migrants are subor-
dinated when represented as marginalized masculini-
ties: in fact, not only gender, but also class and race
play an integral part in the construction of manhood.
As it is stated by Connell (2005), “Race relations may
become an integral part of the dynamic between mas-
culinities. In a white-supremacist context [as the
media discourse turned out to be from this analysis],
black masculinities play symbolic roles for white
gender construction” (Connell, 2005: 80). Following
this line, it is possible to explain the functionality of
this construction of sub-Saharan migrants for
Gaddafi’s international negotiations, for the rebels’
claim on the need for international intervention, and
for the validation of the role of the international com-
munity – including media and journalists.35 Addition-
ally, explanations of migrants’ insecurity and vulnera-
bility to violence are rooted in the negation of
Western ideals by actors involved in the conflict. Also,
the normalization of victimhood and danger impedes
the development of alternative accounts more centred
on the migrants’ voices, because – within this hierarchy32 See BBC News: “Profile: Muammar Gaddafi”, 27 June
2011; at: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-
12488278>.
33 “Sins of the father, sins of the son” is a title of a news
article in Al-Jazeera on 27 February 2011, where Gaddafi
is accused of “exploitation of the plight of the African
people” (AJ 9).
34 See for example AJ (1), (2), (4), (7), and NYT (7).
35 The modern profession of journalism finds its origins in
the Enlightenment period and so is usually associated
with Western values and forms.
Sub-Saharan Migrants’ Masculinities: An Intersectional Analysis of Media Representations 257
of masculinities – experiences and needs expressed by
migrants themselves as well as their role as political ac-
tors are undermined. On the contrary, migrants’ voices
appear in media merely to support facts or opinions
presented by journalists: the existence of sub-Saharan
migrants is not seen independently from the Western
presence; it is through media that sub-Saharans prove
their existence and living conditions. Both ways of clas-
sifying36 sub-Saharans, as well as the logic presented,
become functional for justifying international interven-
tion in the conflict and the contemporary regime of mi-
gration control as the main instruments for guaran-
teeing human security. The hegemonic model of
masculinity is then the one reproduced and legitimized
in media representations through the silencing of sub-
Saharan voices or by contrasting them with (or by the
celebration of) Western values, with their ideals of de-
mocracy and economic wealth. 
Concluding the analysis, we note that media repre-
sentations of different forms of masculinities – within
the narratives presented – worked to construct an idea
of security linked to dominant modern Western val-
ues, including liberal democracy, market-based econo-
mies, rationality, and expertise. Norms and behav-
iours associated to masculinity reinforced these
propositions. Following Bourdieu’s understanding of
symbolic violence, we see that it is the normalization
of vulnerability as well as hostility towards sub-Saha-
ran work as a form of symbolic violence that makes
reflections on and questions about the current domi-
nant conception of security and the actions under-
taken from this perspective difficult. In fact, the me-
dia legitimization of RtoP as normative frame shifts
the attention beyond the state as a protector, to in-
clude for example international agencies and NGOs.
However, it undermines the role of sub-Saharan mi-
grants as political actors, in so far as the media limited
the understanding of bottom-up initiatives to security
initiatives (Huysman/Squire 2009). In short, media
discourse during the Libyan conflict supported the
implementation of RtoP and limited the possibilities
for its critical discussion.37
Further, we have highlighted that responses to sit-
uations of diffused insecurity have been seen as pro-
ceeding almost entirely from Western capacity and
values, as well as the Western paternalistic and heroic
predisposition to help others. However, in repeated
situations these urgent humanitarian actions ignored
the needs and circumstances of sub-Saharan migrants’
insecurity, generating questionable gaps in the effec-
tiveness of those actions as adequate protection. This
is the case for the Western management of the migra-
tion crisis, which we argue has not stopped migrants’
insecurity or mobility, but led to the death of many
sub-Saharans due to the prioritization of control and
borders over the rights of asylum, protection,38 free
mobility, and so on. We raise serious doubts about the
possibility of fostering migrants’ security through these
types of actions and discourses, including the represen-
tations that they entail in terms of migrants’ identities
and needs. Moreover, categorizations are usually cou-
pled with justifications of past or future actions (Leu-
dar/Marsland/Nekvapil 2004). Finally, we conclude
that mainstream media representations played a cen-
tral role in the construction of gendered, racial, and
class-based categorizations that undermined the possi-
bilities for debating social justice beyond the domi-
nant frames of security and migrants’ stereotypes. 
13.6 Conclusion
Investigating the links between migration, the media
representation of masculinities, and human security,
this chapter aimed to show the relevance of intersec-
tional analysis in illuminating the complexity of the
conditions of insecurity faced by vulnerable groups in
conflict situations. The concept of intersectionality
elaborated by Crenshaw has proved to be a useful tool
for studying how power relations at political, repre-
sentational, and cultural levels affect not just women’s
conditions, but also those of other social groups in
marginal positions. Moreover, the understanding of
different levels of intersectionality as a continuum,
where different knowledge and spheres interact,39 al-
lowed an examination of the symbolic representations
as elements influencing structural and institutional
levels and vice versa. The triple jeopardy situation is
reflected for example in how the role of migrants is
conceived by job market forces and institutions, influ-
encing the ways in which the presence of migrants in
Libya is understood by policymakers pushing for the
endorsement of different kinds of state migration pol-
36 As mercenaries or as vulnerable population.
37 See for example Forte (2011a).
38 This is the case with asylum seekers who were returned
to their country of origin, the lack of assistance for boats
at risk, and the prioritizing of detention centres over ade-
quate living conditions in a life-threatening context. 
39 Leudar, Marsland and Nekvapil (2004) make reference
to the concept of ‘dialogical network’ to refer to the
links that exist between various media events and that
are created by different actors around the world. 
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icies in the country and elsewhere; this would in turn
affect foreign workers’ quality of life and media infor-
mation regarding actors involved in migration flows.
In the Libyan case, the structural conditions of vulner-
ability of sub-Saharans have been understood by me-
dia as motives to represent migrants as either passive
victims or dangerous subjects, and this became an im-
pediment to identifying solutions that addressed the
need for the dignified protection of migrants within
particular life-threatening circumstances. 
Further, the possibility to observe this type of dy-
namics offered by intersectional analysis has also ena-
bled us to put the spotlight on the symbolic violence
embedded in media discourses about who should be
protected and by whom, which strongly require ques-
tioning, deconstruction, and reflection. In fact, look-
ing critically at media’s construction of identities, we
observed that the proposed set of categorizations
served to discriminate groups of civilians and normal-
ize an understanding of selective protection which, for
instance, favoured expatriate staff from the ‘interna-
tional community’ over migrant workers and refugees.
The timeline of organized evacuations for migrants at
the beginning of the conflict is one example of this
trend. Thus, acknowledging that civilians are not a ho-
mogeneous group but are divided along sociocultural
and legal boundaries, we argue that media discourses
rhetorically approached the problems of those struc-
turally disadvantaged and legitimized selective protec-
tion of the better-off. In sum, media have been an ac-
tor and an instrument contributing to insecurity.
In terms of media responsibility it is difficult to
make conclusive proposals. The debate about the pos-
sibilities of changing journalists’ practices has been
long-lasting and the prioritization of different ele-
ments – regulatory practices, material resources,
knowledge, sources of information, political agendas,
and ethics involved, among others – has led to a mul-
tiplicity of positions. One of the authors argues from
a socio-constructivist perspective for the importance
and urgency of promoting normative regulations con-
cerning the use of specific categories that reinforce
symbolic violence and cultural stereotypes of con-
tempt for the black race or marginal groups, particu-
larly within a context of conflict. Her reasoning, in
line with APS (1997) recommendations, also implies
processes of cultural awareness within which one’s
media should “take responsibility for representing eth-
nic groups, ethnic differences and conflict between
ethnic groups, in ways which highlight the diversity
within groups and similarities across groups, thereby
discouraging stereotyping” (APS, 1997: 42). The other
author shares the importance of undermining the cir-
culation of racializing and racist discourses, but is
sceptical about the capacity of regulatory practices to
change the editorial choices of mainstream media and
their shareholders, and considers that any regulation
would instead run the risk of increasing the legitima-
tion of mainstream media practices. She instead
makes a claim for supporting independent and self-or-
ganized media that make explicit the standpoint from
which they speak. In line with Harding’s (1993) ideas
of strong objectivity, she suggests moving beyond
ideas of neutrality in journalism, which often translate
objectivity as being a white, bourgeois, and male
standpoint, and favours editorial projects40 which ac-
Table 13.2: Media representations of masculinities during the 2011 Libyan conflict. Source: the authors.
Models of masculinity Associated to Characterized by
Hegemonic masculinity Associated to western actors and embodied 
by the figures of aid workers, professionals 
of the international community, entrepre-
neurs and corporate managers.
Rationality, expertise, wealth, moral 
strength, courage, generosity, capacity for 
self-sacrifice.
Complicit masculinity Associated to the Rebels, and embodied by 
Gaddafi’s opposition, stakeholders of the 
new regime, notables, businessmen, profes-
sionals, exiles.
Proactivity, determination, courage, care for 
others, advanced education, need to be sup-
ported. The ‘lack’ of knowledge and strate-
gies for violent actions.
Subordinated masculinity Associated to Gaddafi’s loyal forces and 
embodied by Gaddafi himself.
Irrationality, cruelty, cowardice, proactivity.
Marginalized masculinity Associated to sub-Saharans in Libya and 
embodied by the poor black migrants.
Poverty, desperation, victimhood, irrationa-
lity, aggressiveness. They are politically under-
mined and have a lack of agency capacity.
40 Examples of independent and self-organized media
might be the Spanish Diagonal; at: <http://www.diago-
nalperiodico.net/-Quienes-somos-.html> or the Pan-
African Pambazuka; at: <http://www.pambazuka.org/
en/about.php>.
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knowledge biases and openly discuss their approach
to social justice (Durham, 1998). 
To discuss the issues of migrants’ security, the Lib-
yan context provides a meaningful case of analysis to
illuminate the consequences of migration policies in
conflict situations. In fact, this country has been one
of the first involved in the process of the externaliza-
tion of EU border control. Further, regulations pro-
ducing the illegality of migrants and the restriction of
mobility have not only worked to relegate migrants to
situations of precariousness and marginality in peace-
ful times. These regulations also impeded migrants’
safe escapes during conflicts and suspended people’s
lives for the indeterminate period of being held in ref-
ugee camps. As the deaths in the Mediterranean
showed, the EU regime of migration control does not
foresee the possibility of accessing airports for sub-Sa-
haran workers in Libya (Kumar 2011). Nor does it al-
low the mobilization of resources, knowledge, and re-
lations outside the rules of humanitarian emergencies.
Reflecting on the guarantees offered by the nor-
mative frame of RtoP is important because, as an ex-
isting mechanism to protect civilians, it failed in the
Libyan case to provide safeguards for sub-Saharan mi-
grants. Instead of suggesting concrete alternative un-
derstandings of security, we emphasize the impor-
tance of promoting further research to identify
mechanisms and practices of protection from a bot-
tom-up perspective. Intersectional analysis can prove
to be a useful tool for empirical studies that move be-
yond universalistic standpoints and instead search for
migrants’ own understanding of security. We would
encourage the Arendtian approach of ‘right to have
rights’ as the right of those in insecure situations to
choose what security might signify for them and how
it would be possible to improve their conditions
(Oman 2010). Doing so may also imply generating dis-
courses and practical alternatives to the unilinear
mainstream media’s narratives on how things ‘should
be’. From this perspective, we argue for a future with
open possibilities to practise alternatives to Western
liberal democracy market-based economies, and the
related understanding of security, that makes possible
a human life with dignity. 
Table 13.3: Articles analysed
Al Jazeera articles 
1. “Libya migrants‘ plight 'desperate’: British minister demands ‘unfettered access’ to help thousands of migrants flee-
ing violence amid anti-Gaddafi uprising”; at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201135165632260669. 
html>.
2. “Migrants suffer in Tripoli camps: Black Libyans and migrants are stuck in Tripoli in squalid conditions and threats of 
violence”; at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/09/201191102134823327.html>.
3. “Migrants forced to fight for Gaddafi: 'They said we must stay to fight when the Americans come', a Ghanaian 
worker tells Al Jazeera from a refugee camp”; at:  <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/2011481 
8291705627.html>.
4. “Migrants 'fleeing Libya' drown off coast: Bodies of some 70 Eritrean asylum seekers fleeing the conflict are 
reported to have been found off the coast”, at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2011/04/
201143201853574844.html>.
5. “The day the Katiba fell: Libya's turning point may have come when protesters overwhelmed a barracks in Beng-
hazi”, at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/spotlight/libya/2011/03/20113175840189620.html>.
6. “Tales from the front: A Libyan rebel speaks: Who are Libya's fighters? And can they defeat Gaddafi? An injured 
rebel says yes, but military analysts aren't so sure”; at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/04/
20114922636100124.html>.
7. “African migrants targeted in Libya: Rights groups fear dozens killed in violent backlash against supposed Gaddafi-
hired mercenaries from sub-Saharan Africa”. With video (2:10min); at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/
2011/02/201122865814378541.html>.
8. “Libya no-fly zone supporters push for UN vote: Washington says the Security Council may need to take measures 
that go beyond a no-fly zone in Libya”; at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2011/03/201131715122293202. 
html>.
9. “Sins of the father, sins of the son: While Gaddafi has relied on empty revolutionary slogans to maintain power, his 
son looks to oil money for his”; at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/02/201122271939751816. 
html>.
10. “Scores killed in Libya tribal clashes: Fighting in southern town of Sabha has killed more than 70 people as African 
tribe says it is facing a 'massacre'”; at: <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2012/03/201232901547564337. 
html>.
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